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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The  Australian  hospital  system  is  characterised  by  the  co-existence  of  private  hospitals,  where 
individuals pay for services and public hospitals, where services are free to all but delivered after a 
waiting time. The decision to purchase insurance for private hospital treatment depends on the 
trade-off between price of treatment, waiting time and the insurance premium. Clearly the potential 
for adverse selection and moral hazard exists. When the endogeneity of the insurance decision is 
accounted for, the extent of moral hazard can be substantial increasing the expected length of a 
hospital stay by a factor of up to three. 
 
 Savage & Wright 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Different countries have different health insurance and health care systems. The United States of 
America has a mainly private system with a small public (free) sector that acts as a safety net for the 
disadvantaged. On the other hand, the United Kingdom has a mainly public (free) system with a 
small private system for those prepared to pay for their health care. Australia is distinctive in having 
a mixed system with large private and public (free) sectors. In 1989-90 around 44% of income units 
had private hospital insurance and 35% of hospital users used a private hospital. In addition private 
hospital  insurance  is  chosen  at  the  individual  or  family  level  unlike  in  the  US  where  health 
insurance is commonly a compulsory part of the employment contract.  
There is an on going debate in the U.S. concerning whether the public system should be extended 
and in the U.K. concerning whether the private system should be extended. A similar debate is on 
going in Australia and as in the U.S. and U.K. is concerned with the appropriate sizes of the private 
and public sectors. Research that analyses the relationship between health insurance and the use of 
health care in the private and public sectors is needed to inform this debate.  
There are two well-known difficulties associated with providing health insurance to individuals. 
These arise because the insurer does not know (a) the risk class to which a particular individual 
belongs and (b) the extent of the loss in well being an individual experiences. In a world with purely 
private health insurance, ignorance of an individual’s risk class leads to adverse selection as only 
high-risk individuals purchase insurance. Ignorance of the extent of the illness or the actual loss in 
well being leads to moral hazard as individuals, who have some control over the extent of their 
treatment and receive insurance payouts on the basis of their health care expenditure, over-utilize 
health services.  
Private hospital insurance takes the form of a schedule of allowances for particular private hospital 
services that  result  in individuals with  different  insurance  policies  facing  a  different  set  of net 
prices. One reason insurance policies take this form is because expenditure on hospital services is 
observable by insurance companies while the individual’s health state vector is not. As previously 
mentioned, this introduces the possibility of moral hazard. Moral hazard can occur because the 
insurance policy alters the individual’s behaviour in a way that decreases the expected profit of the 
insurance company. For example, (i) the existence of insurance might induce the individual to 
devote less resources to preventive care and so increase the probability of an insurance claim and 
decrease the expected profit of the insurance company, or (ii) the existence of insurance might 
induce the individual to purchase more private hospital services than are strictly needed to return 
the individual to a healthy state. This paper will be concerned with the latter case though both are Health Insurance and Health Care Utilization:Theory and Evidence from Australia 1989-90 
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manifestations of the same phenomena, namely, that private hospital insurance induces individuals 
to over-utilize private hospital services. In order to determine the appropriate mix of private and 
public health service and health insurance provision, studies need to be done to ascertain the extent 
of moral hazard and adverse selection under various insurance and health care regimes. 
The aim of the empirical sections of this paper is to ascertain the extent to which the existence of 
insurance induces individuals to purchase more private hospital services than they would if they 
faced  the  true  price  of  those  services  rather  than  the  net  price  under  insurance.  As  such,  an 
indication of the extent of welfare losses that result from the price distortion is given.
1 Moral hazard 
is present if the use of private hospital service k  is decreasing in the ‘net’ price of service k . 
A  number  of  empirical  papers  have  examined  the  determinant  of  an  individual’s  or  families’ 
insurance choice, Ngui, Burrows, and Brown, (1989), Propper (1989), Cameron, Trivedi, Milne, 
and Piggott (1988), and Hurd and McGarry (1997). The general findings are that individuals or 
families are more likely to have private health insurance the greater is their income, the older they 
are, and if they are employed. Health status variables do not seem to impact on health insurance 
choice. A second group of papers take an individual’s or families’ insurance status as given and 
examine the determinants of health service use, Manning, Newhouse, Duan, Keeler, Leibowitz, and 
Marquis (1987), Manning and Marquis (1996), and Hurd and McGarry (1997). The general findings 
are that individuals and families consume more health services the more health insurance cover they 
have, the greater is their income, and to some extent the lower is their health status.  
Health insurance choice depends, amongst other things, on expected future consumption of health 
services and so both the insurance and use decisions are interdependent. Of the papers previously 
mentioned, only the paper by Cameron et al models the interaction between health insurance choice 
and health services use and so is the only paper that can address issues of adverse selection and 
moral hazard. In a more recent contribution Lee (1993) also models this interaction. However, 
neither paper distinguishes between private or public hospital service use and given that much of 
the current debate concerns this issue, work needs to be done with this emphasis. This is particularly 
so in the Australian context because private hospital services are provided at different ‘net’ prices 
depending on the insurance cover held whereas public hospital services are available free to all. As 
a result, moral hazard can only be identified amongst the private hospital users as this is the only 
group that faces different ‘net’ prices.
2 
This paper is an attempt to model and empirically test the interaction between private hospital 
insurance choice and private hospital service use. A three-period model of health insurance and 
                                                            
1 The classic paper on the welfare losses associated with health insurance is Feldstein (1973). More recent papers 
include Feldman and Dowd (1991) and Manning and Marquis (1996). 
2 Cameron et al (1988) did not distinguish between private and public hospital use. Savage & Wright 
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health care utililization is developed. In the first period, an income unit makes an insurance decision 
not knowing what its health state will be in the second period. In the second period the income 
unit’s health state is realized. Given their first period insurance decision, the income unit chooses 
the quantity of private hospital services to consume. In the third period, after a waiting time has 
elapsed, the income unit can consume free public hospital services. The income unit’s insurance 
decision depends on its probability distribution over health states in period 2, the ‘net’ prices of 
private hospital services (given insurance), the waiting time for the various services to be available 
free  in  a  public  hospital,  insurance  premiums,  and  other  socio-economic  variables.  The 
consumption of private hospital services in period two depends on the realization of the health state, 
the ‘net’ prices, the waiting time, and other socio-economic variables. The consumption of public 
hospital services in period three depends on the realized health state in period 2, whether private 
hospital services were consumed in period two, and other socio-economic variables. The theoretical 
model produces reduced form equations for insurance choice and private hospital use that provide a 
rationale for the variables included in the empirical sections of the paper. 
The empirical implementation of the model uses data from the 1989-90 National Health Survey in 
Australia, but is hampered by a lack of data on insurance premiums, ‘net prices’, and waiting times. 
Chronic conditions and reason for hospital use are used as proxies for these variables. Insurance 
choice is estimated with a probit model. In general, it is found that an income unit is more likely to 
have private hospital insurance the greater is income, age of head of the income unit, health status 
as measured by chronic conditions, and other socio-economic variables. The significance of some 
of the health status variables contrasts with previous studies and suggests that adverse selection may 
be present. 
The only quantity variable related to hospital use that appears in the data is the length of the hospital 
stay. This is the dependant variable in the duration model that is estimated. As insurance choice is 
endogenous in the model, the estimated probability of insurance is used as a regressor in these 
duration equations to provide consistent estimates of the moral hazard effect. In addition, reason for 
hospital service use and other socio-economic variables are also included as regressors. Separate 
equations are estimated for income units with different structure and at different stages of the life 
cycle and tests are performed to ascertain whether insurance choice is endogenous, that is, whether 
there is adverse selection.  
In the private hospital duration equations, evidence of moral hazard was found to be significant for 
some, but not all income unit types. Where moral hazard was present, the effect of it on duration 
was quite large, increasing expected durations by a factor of up to three. In contrast to previous 
studies, income was generally found to have a negative effect on duration, perhaps reflecting the Health Insurance and Health Care Utilization:Theory and Evidence from Australia 1989-90 
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opportunity cost of time. Finally, insurance choice was found to be endogenous for all but one 
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2. THE MODEL 
2.1 Single Person Income Units:  
To keep the analysis as simple as possible the theory will be developed for the case where an 
income unit consists of one individual. The individual consumes a consumption good,  c, and a 
vector of hospital services, h. The utility function of the individual is given by 
) ; , ( s h c u ,                    (1) 
where  s is the individual’s health state vector. The 
th m  element of  s is denoted  ] 1 , 0 [ Î
m s  and 
takes on higher values the worse is the outcome  for this particular element of  the health state 
vector.
3 The worse are the outcomes in the health state vector, the lower is utility for a given c and 
h. If the health state vector is indexed so that worse health state vectors get bigger numbers, then 










,  where  s   is  defined  by  the  two 
inequalities and can be interpreted as the health state vector above which hospital services add to 





, and that conditional on s,  (.) u  is a strictly concave function of c 
and h.






c u                      (2) 
 so that the marginal utility of the consumption good increases with worse health outcomes. The 
income unit can borrow and lend at interest rate r . It is assumed that the individual’s income is the 
same in each period and given by  y .
5 
There are three periods. In period 1, the individual knows its current health state vector, 1 s , but not 
its  health  state  vector  for  period  2, 2 s .  However,  the  individual  does  know  the  probability  of 
attaining health state vector  2 s  in period 2. This is given by ) ( 2 s f . It is assumed that the elements 
of the health state vector in period 1 cannot be reduced by consuming hospital services even if they 
take on values other than zero. In period 1, the individual chooses an insurance policy against 
private hospital use in period 2 that specifies a premium and an amount of coverage. Coverage takes 
the form of a schedule of allowances for particular private hospital services. If the price charged for 
                                                            
3 For example, let blood pressure be the 
th m  element of s . The further is the individual’s blood pressure from normal, 
the higher is 
m s . Normal blood pressure has  0 =
m s . 
4 This utility function can be found in Arrow (1976). For  s s £ ,  ) (× u  is just a function of c .  
5 This assumption simplifies notation. Nothing is significantly changed by having different income in different periods. Health Insurance and Health Care Utilization:Theory and Evidence from Australia 1989-90 
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a service by a private hospital exceeds the allowance, then the user of the service is liable for the 
difference. This difference will be denoted the ‘net’ price. Let  i p  be the premium attached to 
insurance policy i and let 
k
i p  be the net price of hospital service k  under policy i. 
In period 2,  2 s  is realized and private hospital services can be purchased. Consumption of the 
appropriate hospital services reduces the elements in the individuals health state vector towards 
their initial level. It is assumed that public hospital services can not be purchased in period 2. 
However, after a waiting period 
k t  for hospital service k , it is assumed that the service is available 
in a public hospital at a price of zero. Period 3 is the period after this waiting time. 
The individual faces a dynamic programming problem. In period 1 it chooses how much income to 
allocate to the consumption good, lending / borrowing, and private hospital insurance, given its 
health state in period 2 is unknown. Given these choices, in period 2, after the realization of the 
individual’s health state vector, the individual chooses whether to obtain treatment in a private or 
public  hospital  and  allocates  income  between  the  consumption  good,  lending  /  borrowing,  and 
private hospital services (if treatment in a private hospital was chosen). The net price of these 
private hospital services is determined by the insurance policy purchased in period 1. Given these 
choices in period 2, in period 3, the income unit allocates income to the consumption good and the 
individuals health state vector is returned to its initial level through the consumption of public 
hospital services. Note that the consumption of private hospital services in period 2 might already 
have achieved this end. Period 3 is the last period in the model  
Periods 1 and 3 have fixed length, normalized to 1, while the length of period 2 depends on health 
state vector,  2 s . Assume that the realization of this vector is
k s2  and requires hospital service  k  in 
order for the elements of 
k s2  to be reduced. In this case, the length of period 2 is 
k t . As is usual, the 
individual’s problem is solved backwards. 
Period 3 
In period 3, all health state vector elements are returned to their initial level (if need be) through the 
consumption  of  free  public  hospital  services. Therefore,  all  period  3 wealth is  allocated  to the 
consumption good. That is 






i i p r a y c
k
+ + =                 (3) 
where  c p   is  the  price  of  the  consumption  good, 
k
i c3   is  the  quantity  of  the  consumption  good 
consumed in period 3 under policy i, t is the waiting period required for the appropriate hospital 
service given 
k s2 , and 
k
i a2  is lending / borrowing in period 2 (borrowing is represented by a negative Savage & Wright 
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value of  2 a ) under insurance policy  i. Substituting the solution for 
k
i c3  into the utility function 
gives period 3 maximized utility under insurance policy i, 






i s c u p s t r a y V = .              (4) 
Period 2 
At the beginning of period 2, given a particular health state vector 
k s2 , and given insurance policy i, 
the individual chooses whether to use a private or public hospital and allocates wealth between the 
consumption good, hospital services, and lending / borrowing to maximize discounted utility.  
Private Hospital: Given a private hospital is chosen, the individual’s wealth allocation problem is 
) (
3
1 ) ( 2




































i c a r y a h p c p 1 2 2 2 ) 1 ( + + = + + ,               (6) 
where hospital service  k  is the appropriate hospital service to return the health state vector to its 
initial level, 
k
i h2  is the quantity of private hospital service k , and  r  is the subjective discount rate. 
The first order conditions to this problem are given in the Appendix. 
These conditions have the usual interpretation. Income is allocated between the consumption good, 
private hospital services, and lending / borrowing so that, (1) the within period marginal rate of 
substitution of the consumption good and private hospital service  k  equals the price ratio, (2) the 
across period marginal utilities for the consumption good are equal after appropriate discounting, 
and (3) the across period marginal utilities per dollar spent of private hospital services and the 
consumption good are equal after appropriate discounting. 
The solution to this problem for 
k
i c2 , 
k
i a2 , and 
k
i h2  are all functions of  





k s a r y p p s t r .               (7) 
Substitute this solution into the objective function to obtain private hospital maximized discounted 
utility conditional on health state,
k s2 , and insurance policy i. Denote this by 






i s a r y p p s t V r .              (8) 
Public Hospital: Given a public hospital is chosen, the individual’s wealth allocation problem is 
identical to (5) except for the omission of 
k
i h2 , the quantity of private hospital services consumed. In 
the solution to this problem consumption is allocated across periods so that marginal utilities of the Health Insurance and Health Care Utilization:Theory and Evidence from Australia 1989-90 
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consumption  good  across  periods  are  equal  after  appropriate  discounting.  The  solution  to  this 
problem for 
k
i c2  and 
k
i a2 , are all functions of  
) , , , , ), ( , ( 2 1 2
k
i c
k s a r y p s t r .                 (9) 
Substitute this solution into the objective function to obtain public hospital maximized discounted 
utility conditional on health state,
k s2 , and insurance policy i. Denote this by 








i s a r y p p s t V r ,            (10) 
where the asterisk denotes public hospital utility. 
Private Hospital – Public Hospital Choice: A private hospital is chosen for treatment if 
) ( ) (
*




i V V                  (11) 
and a public hospital is chosen if the inequality is reversed. This choice depends on all the variables 
in  (7)  and (8).  Assume  that the  realization  of  the  health state  vector  in  period 2, 
k s2 ,  requires 
hospital service  k to return it to its initial state. The individual faces a tradeoff in period 2. The 
health  state  vector  could  be  improved  (moved  closer  to  its  initial  realization)  instantaneously 




i h p 2  or in  ) ( 2
k s t  periods through treatment in a 
public hospital at zero costs. 







i V V V = . Follow the above hospital choice procedure for every possible health state 
vector and then multiply maximized discounted utility conditional on the health state, 
k
i V2 ˆ , by the 
probability of that health state being realized. This yields period 2 expected maximized discounted 
utility in period 1, given insurance policy i, and is given by 
∫ = 2 2 2 2 1 2 ) ( (.) ˆ )) ( , , , , , , , ( ds s f V s f p t a r y p EV i i i c i r ,         (12) 
where  ,...) ,..., (
1 k t t t =  and  ,...) ,..., (
1 k
i i i p p p =  are vectors whose elements are waiting times and net 
prices for all hospital services, respectively. All health states are possible and so all net prices and 
waiting times are relevant in determining period 2 expected maximized discounted utility in period 
1. 
Period 1 
In period 1, the individual does not know which health state vector will be realized in period 2. The 
individual allocates income between the consumption good, lending / borrowing, and insurance to 
maximize period 1 discounted expected utility. Given insurance policy  i with premium  i p , the 
individual’s problem is Savage & Wright 















               (13) 
subject to 
y a c p i i i c = + + p 1 1 .                 (14) 
The first order conditions to this problem are given in the Appendix. 
As for period 2, these conditions have the usual interpretation. Given insurance policy i, income is 
allocated between the consumption good and lending / borrowing so that the marginal utility of the 
consumption good in period 1 is equated to the expected marginal utility of the consumption good 
in period 3 and so that this is equal to the expected marginal utility in period 2 after appropriate 
discounting.  
The solutions for  i c1  and  i a1  are both functions of 
)) ( , , , , , , , ( 2 s f p t r y p i i c r p .               (15) 
These solutions are substituted into the objective function to get period 1 maximizes discounted 
expected utility conditional on insurance policy i. This is denoted 
i V1 )) ( , , , , , , , ( 2 s f p t r y p i i c r p .              (16) 
This procedure is followed for all insurance policies and policy i is chosen if 
i j V V j i ¹ " ³ (.) (.) 1 1 .                (17) 
Assume that policy i has been chosen in period 1. In period 1 the individual does not know which 
health  state  vector  will  be  realized  in  period  2,  but  there  is  some  probability  of  a  bad  health 
outcome. As a result, in order to equate marginal utilities between periods, the individual transfers 
wealth from period 1 to period 2 and has an expectation of transferring wealth from period 3 to 
period 2. This is achieved via lending in period 1 and borrowing in period 2 and / or through the 
purchase  of  private  hospital  insurance  in  period  1.  The  insurance  premium  reduces  disposable 
wealth in period 1 and increases disposable wealth in period 2 through reducing the net price of 
private hospital services. In period 2, the health state vector is realized. If the health outcome is 
good, and the individual has lent in period 1, then the individual will lend in period 2 to satisfy 
(A.4) of the Appendix. On the other hand, if the health outcome is bad the individual will transfer 
wealth from period 3 to period 2 through borrowing in order to satisfy (A.4). In this analysis, 
assumption (2) is playing a crucial role. If the inequality in (2) was reversed, then there would be no 
role for insurance or lending to transfer wealth to period 2.  
From (17), the insurance policy that is chosen is the one that maximizes discounted expected utility. 
When making this choice all insurance premiums and all net prices under all policies are relevant. Health Insurance and Health Care Utilization:Theory and Evidence from Australia 1989-90 
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Let  ,...) ,..., ( 1 i p p p =  be the vector of net price vectors and let  ,...) ,..., ( 1 i p p p =  be the vector of 
insurance premiums. The choice of insurance policy depends on 
)) ( , , , , , , , ( 2 s f p t r y pc r p .               (18) 
Note that the individual might choose not to purchase private hospital insurance and transfer wealth 
between periods through lending and borrowing alone. 
2.2 Many Person Income Units 
In the analysis above it has been assumed that the income unit is an individual. This assumption is 
now relaxed and the theory is amended to allow for income units that consists of more than one 
individual. The income unit’s utility function is 
),...) ( ),... ( ( 1 × × j u u U ,                 (19) 
where  ) (× j u  is the utility function of individual  j  in the income unit and takes the form given in (1) 
above. At the beginning of period 2 individual  j  in the income unit realizes a particular health state 
vector,
kj s2 . Hospital service  k  is the appropriate service to return the vector to its initial settings. 
The vector of these individual health state vectors is denoted 
K S2 , where the superscript K  signifies 
the vector of appropriate hospital services to return all the individuals’ health state vectors to there 
initial settings. The vector of waiting times for these hospital services under insurance policy i is 
denoted  ) ( 2
K K
i S T  and the vector of net prices for these services is denoted 
K
i P . The solution to the 
period 2 problem for individual  j ’s consumption of the consumption good and consumption of 
private hospital services is not formally stated but are all functions of 






i S a r y P p S T r              (20) 
as is the solution for income unit lending / borrowing. 
Whether the income unit chooses a private or public hospital for treatment and how much wealth 
the income unit allocates to private hospital services for an individual depends on the health state of 
all  members  of  the  income  unit,  the  waiting  time  associated  with  all  the  appropriate  hospital 
services, and the net prices of these private hospital services.  
For example, if only one member of an income unit realizes a poor health outcome, the income unit 
might purchase the appropriate private hospital service. However, if two individuals in the income 
unit have poor health outcomes the income unit might purchase the appropriate private hospital 
service for one individual, but wait and obtain treatment for the other individual in a public hospital. 
In period 1, the income unit does not know which health state vector, 2 S , will be realized. The 
choice of insurance policy depends on Savage & Wright 
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)) ( , , , , , , , ( 2 S g p t r y pc r p ,               (21) 
where  ) ( 2 S g  gives the probability that the income unit will attain health state vector  2 S  in period 2. 
As in (18) above, all net prices of all private hospital services under all insurance policies are 
relevant as are the waiting times for all services. 
2.3 Discussion 
The model developed in this section has demonstrated the interdependence between the insurance 
decision and the hospital service use decision. Individuals with extensive insurance coverage face 
lower net prices for private hospital services and ceteris paribus are expected to use more of these 
services if a poor health state is realized. This is moral hazard. On the other hand, individuals who 
have a high probability of a poor health state being realized and who require significant hospital 
services to improve their health are expected ceteris paribus to have extensive insurance coverage. 
This is adverse selection. The empirical sections of this paper attempt to ascertain the extent of 
moral hazard and the existence of adverse selection in the provision of private hospital services and 
insurance in Australia in 1989-90. Health Insurance and Health Care Utilization:Theory and Evidence from Australia 1989-90 
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3. THE AUSTRALIAN HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM AND THE DATA 
The Health Insurance System 
In  1984,  a  universal  system  of  health  care  subsidies,  known  as  Medicare,  was  introduced  into 
Australia. These subsidies are based on a schedule of fees known as the Medical Benefits Schedule 
(MBS). The MBS is adjusted annually by the government. Under Medicare, individuals who choose 
to be treated in a public hospital as a public (Medicare) patient are treated by doctors and specialists 
nominated by the hospital. These services are free of charge whether or not the individual has 
private hospital insurance.  
Individuals who choose to be treated as a private patient in a private or public hospital have choice 
of doctor and Medicare pays 75% of the MBS for services and procedures provided by the doctor. 
The remaining 25% (the gap) can be covered by private hospital  insurance.
6 If the doctor charges 
more than the MBS, these additional charges are the responsibility of the patient and can not be 
covered  by  insurance.  Hospital  accommodation  charges,  theatre  fees,  recovery  ward  charges, 
dressings etc. are the responsibility of the patient, but can be covered totally by private hospital 
insurance. This system was in operation in 1989-90. 
The Data 
The data used in the empirical sections of this paper is from the 1989-90 National Health Survey 
released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. The data contains 54,241 fully completed individual 
questionnaires. This represented about one in 300 of the population. For the purposes of this paper a 
number of individuals and income units were deleted from the sample. Reasons for deletion are 
given in the Appendix.  
After deletions there were 22,913 income units left in the sample. Of these 10,350 were singles, 
5221 were couples, and 6067 were couples with dependants.
7 Associated with these income units 
were a total of 45,249 individuals. Of these 10,350 were in singles income units, 10,442 were in 
couples income units, and 24,457 were in couples with dependants income units. 
Questions asked of individuals in the survey included  
(a) whether they had private hospital insurance, 
(b) whether they had existing medical conditions and what they were 
                                                            
6 When the gap amount exceeds a certain amount in a calendar year, Medicare covers any further gap amounts 
completely.  
7 The remaining 1,275 income units were singles with dependants which are not used in this study.  Savage & Wright 
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(c) whether they visited a hospital in the last 12 months, and whether it was a private or public 
hospital, 
(d) the reason for visiting hospital and length of stay in hospital, 
and many other socio-economic questions. 
In the survey, approximately 104 conditions and reasons for hospital use were listed. To make the 
number more manageable these were aggregated into 27 main groups, with 3 sub groups in each 
(major, serious, minor). These groups were chosen on the basis of the type of doctor who would 
normally attend to the condition. As will be seen later, this basis for grouping fits nicely with the 
theory and the empirical implementation of the theory.
8 The variables used in the empirical analysis 
are defined in the Appendix. 
About 13.5% of individuals in the sample used hospital services in the previous 12 months. This 
percentage  by  income  unit  type  was,  13.9%  for  individuals  in  single  person  units,  15.7%  for 
individuals in couples units, and 12.2% for individuals in couples with dependants units. Table 1, 
which shows the percentages of individuals using private and public hospitals and insurance status 
for each type of income unit, suggests that most individuals who use a private hospital have private 
hospital insurance while most individuals who use a public hospital do not have private hospital 
insurance. It should be noted that some individuals who do not have private hospital insurance 
choose to be treated in a private hospital. For example, 25% of single private hospital users did not 
have private hospital insurance. 
                                                            
8 The grouping of the conditions and reasons for use were undertaken at the Centre for Health Economics Research and 
Evaluation  at the University of Sydney. Health Insurance and Health Care Utilization:Theory and Evidence from Australia 1989-90 
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TABLE 1 : PRIVATE HOSPITAL INSURANCE STATUS OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC HOSPITAL USERS BY 
TYPE OF INCOME UNIT  
 
              Hospital Type    % Insured    Observations 
Singles  Private    75.0    459 
  Public    23.06    977 
Couples  Private    84.6    629 
  Public    36.2    1005 
Couples with Dependants  Private    89.5    1020 
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4. THE EMPIRICAL MODELING STRATEGY 
The primary aim of this paper is to ascertain the extent of moral hazard in the provision of private 
hospital services in Australia.
9 In the process the existence of adverse selection is ascertained as 
well. Reduced form hospital service use equations (7) and (20) list the variables on which hospital 
service use depends. It is important to note that the ‘net’ prices in these equations are contingent on 
the insurance policy held by the individual. Different individuals have different insurance coverage 
and so face different ‘net’ prices. As a result the relationship between insurance coverage and 
hospital service use can be estimated. 
In  Australia,  in  1989-90,  there  was  basically  one  type  of  private  hospital  insurance  policy. 
Therefore, there are only two sets of ‘net’ prices to consider in estimating private hospital service 
use, ‘net’ prices with insurance and prices without insurance. Unfortunately, the NHS data does not 
contain information on ‘net’ prices, but it does provide information on whether an individual had 
private hospital insurance or not. Therefore, a private hospital insurance dummy variable, which 
takes on the value 1 if the individual has private hospital insurance and zero if not, can be used in 
the hospital service use equations to account for different ‘net’ prices. A positive coefficient on the 
insurance  dummy  would  be  evidence  of  moral  hazard.  However,  there  is  a  problem  with  this 
dummy variable because it is endogenous. Whether an individual has insurance or not depends on, 
among other things, expected private hospital use. This endogeneity creates a potential covariance 
between the insurance dummy and the disturbance term in equations (7) and (20) so that single 
equations estimates of the coefficients attached to the regressors are inconsistent. 
To produce consistent estimates of the moral hazard effect of insurance a procedure suggested by 
Dubin and McFadden (1984) is adopted. A probit model of insurance choice is estimated and the 
estimated probability of having private hospital insurance is substituted for the insurance dummy 
when  estimating  the  hospital  service  use  equation.
10  A  Wu-Hausman  (1973-1978)  test  is  then 
performed  to  ascertain  whether  insurance  choice  is  endogenous.  If  it  is  endogenous,  then 
individuals who expect to be large users of hospital services have more insurance coverage and so 
the Wu-Hausman test is a test for adverse selection.  
4.1 Private Hospital Insurance Choice 
The theory in section 2 provides reduced form equations for estimating models of insurance choice. 
Insurance choice is an income unit decision, couples and couples with dependants pay the same 
                                                            
9To be precise, this paper investigates the extent of moral hazard in private hospital service use, given a users is treated 
in a private hospital. No attempt is made to extrapolate to the population of all hospital users. 
10Rather than estimating insurance choice and hospital service use simultaneously, this two-step procedure is adopted 
for reasons of tractability. Health Insurance and Health Care Utilization:Theory and Evidence from Australia 1989-90 
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premium for family cover regardless of the number of dependants in the income unit. Therefore, 
separate probit models are estimated for income units with different compositions. 
Singles: In equation (18) of section 2, the variables on which the private hospital insurance choice 
hinges are given. Unfortunately the National Health Survey 1989-90 (NHS) does not include data 
on private hospital insurance premiums, net prices of private hospital services, nor waiting times for 
these services. However, proxies for these variables exist in the data. 
The data contains information on health status, in particular, it contains information on long-term 
(chronic) medical conditions.
11 Chronic medical conditions give an indication of the individual’s 
health status and so the probability of different health state vectors being realized in some future 
period. In addition, as different conditions require different treatments and these different treatments 
have different waiting times and net prices, an individual’s chronic conditions are proxies for t , p, 
and  ) ( 2 s f  as well.
12 Since chronic medical conditions are proxies for a number of variables in (18) 
it is impossible to separate the effects of waiting time, net prices, and health state probabilities on 
insurance choice. However, given the data, this is the best that can be done.  
As  well  as  income  and  chronic  medical  conditions,  other  variables  are  included  in  the  probit 
analyis. These variables capture a combination of the probability of various health states being 
realized in the future and the heterogeneity of individuals in the data. These variables include age, 
sex, region, employment status, education, and country of birth. 
Condition  17  in  section  2  states  that  private  hospital  insurance  will  be  purchased  if  period  1 
maximized  discounted  expected  utility  is  greater  with  insurance  than  without.  Let 
*
1 V   be  the 
difference between period 1 maximized discounted expected utility with insurance and without. 
This difference is not observed, but is assumed to arise from the model 
m d + = '
*
1 A V ,                  (22) 
where  m has a normal distribution with mean zero and variance one. What is observed is whether 
private hospital insurance was purchased, that is 
1 1 = V  if  0
*
1 > V  
0 1 = V  if  0
*
1 £ V . 
This gives rise to the probit model  
Prob ) ' ( ] 1 [ 1 d A V F = = ,               (23) 
                                                            
11Chronic medical conditions are ones which have lasted at least six months, or are expected to last for six months or 
more. 
12 This provides the rationale for grouping conditions and reasons for hospital use by doctor usually seen for this 
condition. Different types of doctors charge different net prices and have different waiting times for their services. Savage & Wright 
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where  ) (× F   denotes  the  standard  normal  distribution  function  and  A  includes  chronic  medical 
condition  dummies  and  the  other  explanatory  variables  mentioned  above.  The  aggregation  of 
chronic conditions into 27 main conditions meant that an individual may have two or more chronic 
conditions  in  the  same  main  group.  It  can  be  presumed  that  an  individual  with  two  or  more 
orthopaedic conditions is more likely to realize a poor health state than an individual with one 
orthopaedic condition, so dummy variables for one or more, two or more, three or more etc.chronic 
conditions are employed.
13 
Couples and Couples with Dependants: For income units that do not consist of a single individual, 
the variables on which the insurance choice hinges are given in (21). The difference between (18) 
and (21) is that the individual’s probability density is replaced by the income unit’s joint probability 
density over the vector of health state vectors. The chronic conditions of the income unit are the 
appropriate proxy for this. Income unit chronic condition dummy variables are created in the same 
way  as  they  were  for  singles  except  the  conditions  of  each  member  of  the  income  unit  are 
aggregated. So if one member of a couple has two chronic neurological conditions and the other 
member has one chronic neurological condition then the one or more, two or more, and three or 
more neurological condition dummy variables take the value 1. 
 
4.2 Private Hospital Use 
 
Equations (7) and (20) are the reduced form private hospital use equations of individuals. They 
specify the variables on which use depends. As already mentioned, the National Health Insurance 
Survey 1989-90 does not include data on the net prices of private hospital services nor the actual 
realization of the individual’s health state vector. However, data is available on the reason for use of 
hospital services. This variable is used as a proxy for the realized health state. It also serves as a 
proxy for the ‘net’ price of the appropriate hospital service which returns the health state vector to 
its initial settings. Different services have different ‘net’ prices. Reason for use also controls for the 
fact that some health states necessarily involve the use of more hospital services than others.
14 
The quantity of hospital service k is not given in the NHS survey. The only quantity variable on 
which there is data is the duration of stay in hospital. Let the duration of stay in a private hospital be 
given  by  the  continuous  random  variable,  T ,  which  has  distribution  function,  ) ; ( X t F   and 
probability  density  function,  ) ; ( X t f ,  where  X is  a  vector  of  time-invariant  covariates.  The 
probability  of  a  duration  of  stay  being  greater  than  t,  is  given  by  the  survivor  function 
) ; ( 1 ) ; ( X t F X t S - = . The hazard function, 
                                                            
13 For some conditions, not all of these dummies are relevant. For example no single person has more than 2 conditions 
usually attended to by a cardiologist. 
14 Open heart surgery requires more hospital services than a broken leg. Health Insurance and Health Care Utilization:Theory and Evidence from Australia 1989-90 






X t h = ,                   (24) 
is the probability that the patient will leave hospital in the short interval of length  dt  after  t, 
conditional on the patient still being in hospital at time t. Note that 
dt
X t S d
X t h
) ; ( log
) ; ( - =  and so  )} ; ( exp{ ) ; ( X t H X t S - = ,      (25) 




) ; ( ) ; (  is known as the cumulative or integrated hazard. The above relations 
imply that once one of the probability density function, the survivor function, or the hazard function 
are known, the others can be deduced.
15  
In  accelerated  failure  time  models  the  effect  of  the  covariates, X ,  is  to  rescale  the  time  axis 
multiplicatively so that  
) ( 0 X T T q × = ,                    (26) 
where hospital duration of an individual with covariates,  X , is accelerated or decelerated relative to 
0 T  according to whether  1 < q  or  1 > q , and  0 T  is a random variable with a distribution independent 







{ } ; { ) ; ( 0 0 X
t S
X
t T prob X t T prob X t S
q q
× = × ³ = ³ =       (27) 
is the survivor function for the random variable,T . The corresponding probability density function 























× × = ,    (28) 
where  ) ( 0 t f  and  ) ( 0 t h  are the probability density function and hazard function associated with 
) ( 0 t S .  
As the acceleration factor  ) (X q  must be non-negative it is usual to let 
b q
' ) (
X e X =  and estimate it 
using the linear regression 
0 log ' log T X T + = b .                  (29) 
Different parametric specifications for the distribution of  0 logT  give different probability density 
functions, survivor functions, and hazard functions for T .
16  
                                                            
15 These relationships are derived in Lancaster (1990). Savage & Wright 
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The regression model above, (29), is estimated with the NHS data. The log of length of stay is the 
dependent  variable  and  the  covariates  (regressors)  are  reason  for  hospital  stay,  the  estimated 
probability that an individual has private hospital insurance (obtained from the insurance choice 
probit analysis), and some socio-economic variables. The latter includes region of residence. In 
Australia, health expenditure is a state rather than federal responsibility so that different states can 
have different treatment regimes that may also differ within the state. 
The estimated coefficient on the estimated probability of insurance variable gives an indication of 
moral hazard. If this coefficient is positive, then  1 ) ( > X q  and time is decelerated, that is, if an 
individual has insurance then their expected duration in a private hospital is longer. 
Before estimation, however, one further econometric issue must be dealt with, namely, interval 
censored duration data. 
Interval Censored Data: In the NHS, the data on duration of stay is grouped into 5 intervals: 0 
nights, 1-6 nights, 7-14 nights, 15 nights-1 month, and more than 1 month. As the regression model 
requires the log of duration of stay, these intervals are converted to hour intervals with the lowest 
bound made greater than zero. The translation is given in Table 2 where interval  j  has bounds 
given by  1 + - j j a a . 
TABLE 2: LENGTH OF PRIVATE HOSPITAL STAY IN NIGHTS CONVERTED TO HOURS 
Interval,  j   1  2  3  4  5 
Nights  0  1 - 6  7 - 14  15 - 1 
month 
> 1 month 
Hours,  1 + - j j a a    2-8  8 - 152  152 - 344  344 - 728  >728 
 
In Table 2, 0 nights has become 2 - 8 hours. The rationale for this is that 2 hours is about the 
minimum stay in hospital for a procedure and if a patient stays longer than 8 hours then usually they 
would stay over night.
17 
Assume that the latent structure of the hospital use equation to be estimated is given by  
N i X T i i i ,..., 1 log
* = + ¢ = e b               (30) 
where 
* log i T  is the unobserved dependent variable for observation i (in our case the log of the 
actual length of hospital stay) and the error term,  i e , is distributed the same as  i T0 log .What is 
observed is the interval in which the actual length of stay falls, that is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
16 Lancaster 1990 shows that if  0 LogT  is distributed as a Type 1 Extreme Value distribution, then the probability 
density function of T  is the exponential probability density with constant hazard rate given by 
q
1
. Health Insurance and Health Care Utilization:Theory and Evidence from Australia 1989-90 
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j Ti = log  if  1
* log log log + < < j i j a T a . 
For an observation that lies in interval  j , the appropriate probability is 




1 0 b b i j i j X a F X a F - - - +       (31) 
where  ) ( 1 ) ( 0 0 t S t F - = and estimation proceeds using maximum likelihood estimation.
18 
Model (29) is estimated for individuals in single, couple, and couple with dependants income units. 
Although (20) suggests that the health state vectors of all individuals in the income unit should be 
included as regressors, only the individual’s own reason for use is used in the estimation because 















                                                                                                                                                                                                 
17 The lower bound in intervals 2-5 are actually, 8.0001, 152.0001, 344.0001, and 728.0001, respectively. 
18 The SAS Lifereg procedure is used to estimate the model. Savage & Wright 
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5. RESULTS 
5.1 Private Hospital Insurance Choice 
The single and couple income units were separated into young (head aged less than 50 years) and 
old partitions and separate probit models were estimated for each, the rationale being that young 
and old, singles and couples are very distinct groups with different behaviour.
19 Regressors included 
variables related to health status, region, country of birth, and presence of a veteran’s affairs health 
card. A summary of  results is given in Table 3. For the continuous variables, income and family 
size, the entries in the table give the estimated coefficients and the marginal probabilities calculated 
at data means. For the dummy variables, the marginal probabilities denote the change in probability 
associated with changing the dummy variable from 0 to 1.  
For young singles and couples these probabilities are relative to an income unit with a male head 
aged under 35 years of age, and for old singles and couples these probabilities are relative to a male 
head aged under 50 years. For couples with dependents the reference head is aged under 35 years. 
For  singles  the  reference  income  unit  head  is  also  not  in  the  labor  force,  only  has  a  school 
qualification, was born in Australia, lives in metropolitan Sydney, and has no chronic conditions. 
For couples, the reference income unit has a head born in Australia, lives in metropolitan Sydney, 
has both the head and spouse not in the labor force, has both the head and spouse with only a school 
qualification, and has a head and spouse with no chronic conditions. 
                                                            
19 The results on insurance and duration confirm this. Health Insurance and Health Care Utilization:Theory and Evidence from Australia 1989-90 
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TABLE 3 :SELECTED COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES AND MARGINAL PROBABILITIES FROM MODELS OF HOSPITAL INSURANCE CHOICE  
 
 
  YOUNG SINGLES    YOUNG COUPLES    COUPLES WITH DEPENDANTS    OLD COUPLES    OLD SINGLES 
  Coef.  Std.Err  P>|z|  dF/dx  x-bar    Coef.  Std.Err  P>|z|  dF/dx  x-bar    Coef.  Std.Err  P>|z|  dF/dx  x-bar    Coef.  Std.Err  P>|z|  dF/dx  x-bar    Coef.  Std.Err  P>|z|  dF/dx  x-bar 
intcept  -1.029  0.128  0.000        -1.102  0.309  0.000        -0.713  0.150  0.000        -0.401  0.119  0.001        -0.996  0.117  0.000     
hdinc  0.018  0.002  0.000  0.006  21.306    0.019  0.003  0.000  0.008  30.221    0.016  0.002  0.000  0.006  31.088    0.027  0.003  0.000  0.011  0.001    0.051  0.005  0.000  0.019  0.002 
sdinc              0.015  0.005  0.002  0.006  18.806    0.005  0.003  0.035  0.002  11.467    0.007  0.004  0.057  0.003  9.799             
size                          -0.075  0.020  0.000  -0.030  4.022                         
hsex  0.176  0.160  0.270  0.063  0.387                                        0.090  0.086  0.294  0.033  0.699 
hmvet  0.350  0.447  0.433  0.133  0.001    0.515  0.622  0.408  0.193  0.003    0.243  0.206  0.237  0.093  0.008    -0.665  0.079  0.000  -0.258  0.126    -0.697  0.152  0.000  -0.212  0.043 
hfvet  -0.029  0.728  0.969  -0.010  0.000    0.553  0.682  0.417  0.205  0.001    0.141  0.563  0.802  0.055  0.001    -0.289  0.198  0.145  -0.115  0.019    -0.773  0.106  0.000  -0.232  0.069 
Age dummies                                                         
dh3550  0.181  0.048  0.000  0.066  0.184    0.313  0.088  0.000  0.124  0.425    0.190  0.044  0.000  0.075  0.577                         
dh5065                          0.262  0.077  0.001  0.101  0.096                         
dh65                          0.552  0.290  0.057  0.199  0.005    -0.045  0.069  0.514  -0.018  0.437    -0.180  0.067  0.007  -0.065  0.353 
Country of birth                                                     
hnzuk  -0.445  0.064  0.000  -0.142  0.087    -0.375  0.114  0.001  -0.148  0.127    -0.427  0.058  0.000  -0.169  0.118    -0.508  0.074  0.000  -0.200  0.143    -0.397  0.080  0.000  -0.135  0.122 
hseur  -0.462  0.121  0.000  -0.144  0.022    -0.413  0.178  0.020  -0.163  0.042    -0.227  0.071  0.001  -0.090  0.080    -0.543  0.088  0.000  -0.213  0.096    -0.190  0.111  0.088  -0.067  0.051 
hweur  -0.410  0.188  0.029  -0.130  0.009    -0.488  0.258  0.059  -0.190  0.020    -0.343  0.117  0.003  -0.136  0.025    -0.472  0.143  0.001  -0.185  0.027    -0.213  0.161  0.185  -0.074  0.022 
hasia  -0.426  0.103  0.000  -0.135  0.033    -0.604  0.220  0.006  -0.232  0.025    -0.740  0.107  0.000  -0.284  0.034    -0.639  0.222  0.004  -0.246  0.013    -0.030  0.194  0.877  -0.011  0.015 
hotherc  -0.289  0.096  0.002  -0.096  0.041    -0.598  0.173  0.001  -0.231  0.057    -0.661  0.079  0.000  -0.257  0.068    -0.672  0.106  0.000  -0.259  0.061    -0.315  0.117  0.007  -0.108  0.053 
Health status                                                         
hmsmok  -0.010  0.002  0.000  -0.004  5.473    -0.005  0.003  0.057  -0.002  11.485    -0.004  0.001  0.001  -0.002  12.316    -0.000  0.001  0.797  -0.000  12.664    -0.001  0.003  0.657  -0.000  3.847 
hfsmoke  -0.016  0.003  0.000  -0.006  2.740    -0.008  0.003  0.027  -0.003  7.645    -0.013  0.002  0.000  -0.005  7.190    -0.005  0.002  0.049  -0.002  5.885    -0.011  0.003  0.000  -0.004  3.865 
hmalc  -0.002  0.001  0.012  -0.001  17.769    -0.002  0.001  0.068  -0.001  25.557    0.000  0.001  0.882  0.000  22.156    -0.002  0.001  0.107  -0.001  18.122    -0.001  0.001  0.508  -0.000  6.441 
hfalc  -0.001  0.002  0.589  -0.000  4.483    -0.004  0.003  0.228  -0.002  8.379    0.000  0.002  0.814  0.000  5.515    0.001  0.002  0.565  0.001  6.183    0.009  0.003  0.006  0.003  2.861 
 
LogL  -3896.0  -911.0  3493.2  1995.0  -1897.5 
Pseudo 
2 R   0.106  0.184  0.162  0.198  0.175 
Observations  6806  1614  6067  3597  3528 
LR test 
statistic 




40  48  63  52  39 
Critical  
2 c   8 . 55
2
40 = c   5 . 67
2
50 = c   1 . 79
2
60 = c   5 . 67
2
50 = c   8 . 55
2
40 = c  
NOTE:  Other explanatory variables in the model not reported in the Table are dummies for regions, employment status, education, and chronic conditions Savage & Wright 
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In all cases, income has a significant, though small, positive impact on the probability 
of having private hospital insurance. This is consistent with the findings of Ngui, 
Burrows and Brown (1989), who used the 1983 ABS Australian Health Survey to 
estimate a logit model of private hospital insurance choice for individuals. It is also 
consistent with the findings of Cameron, Trivedi, Milne and Piggott (1988), who used 
the  1977-78  ABS  Australian  Health  Survey  to  estimate  a  logit  model  of  private 
hospital choice for singles over the age of 18. Propper (1989) obtained similar results 
for families in England and Wales as did Hurd and McGarry (1997) for the elderly in 
the  United  States  of  America.  In  addition,  Table  3  reveals  that  the  marginal 
probability attached to the income of the head is similar to that of the spouse in young 
couples, less similar for couples with dependants, and dissimilar for old couples. It 
would appear that the spouse’s income is less important in the insurance decision the 
older is the couple. 
As in Ngui et al and Cameron et al, age (except for the very old) tends to have a 
positive  impact  on  the  probability  of  having  private  hospital  insurance.  This  is 
reflected in the  marginal probabilities on the age dummy variables which tend to 
increase  for  higher  age  bands.  If  the  head  of  an  income  unit  was  born  outside 
Australia, this has a negative impact on the probability of having private hospital 
insurance for all income unit types except old singles. The institutional setting in the 
country of origin may explain this result, a result that was also found in Cameron et 
al. A veteran’s affairs health card lowers the probability of purchasing private hospital 
insurance for old singles and old couples. This is not surprising as holders of veteran’s 
affairs health cards were eligible for free treatment in designated veterans’ hospitals in 
1989-90. Nicotine and alcohol consumption are included as health status variables. 
Both reduce the probability of having private hospital insurance. This might be related 
to risk preferences. 
As  in  Cameron  et  al,  living  in  Queensland  has  a  strong  negative  impact  on  the 
likelihood of having private hospital. This seems to be a remnant of the fact that even 
prior  to  the  introduction  of  Medicare  in  1984,  the  Queensland  state  government 
provided  public  hospital  services  free  to  all.  There  is  a  general  tendency  for 
employment, whether full or part-time, to increase the probability of having private 
hospital  insurance  while  unemployment  tends  to  lower  this  probability.  This  is  a Health Insurance and Health Care Utilization:Theory and Evidence from Australia 1989-90 
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standard result, see Ngui et al and Propper. The same is true of post school education 
as in Cameron et al. 
Unlike  previous  studies,  in  this  paper  health  status  is  captured  by  a  detailed 
breakdown  of  chronic  conditions.  Many  of  these  conditions  are  found  to  be 
individually and jointly significant
20. This provides some initial evidence of adverse 
selection in that income units that purchase private hospital insurance are ones with 
poor health status. Most of the conditions found to be significant are categorised as 
minor reflecting the importance of general health status rather than the presence of 
major conditions for insurance choice. Previous studies have failed to model detailed 
health status variables so it is not surprising that health status is rarely found to be 
significant. 
21 In this study different conditions are found to be significant for different 
types of income units. This suggests it is heterogeneity between income units that is 
being captured rather than waiting time or ‘net’ price as these would be constant 
across income unit types.  
5.2 Private Hospital Duration of Stay 
A  breakdown  of  the  duration  of  stay  by  income  unit  is  presented  in  Table  4. 
Individuals  in  young  income  units  tend  to  stay  in  private  hospitals  for  shorter 
durations than individuals in older income units. This is evident from Table 4, since as 
we move across a row, from young to old, the percentage of an income unit type with 
a  particular  duration,  falls  for  short  durations  (1  and  2),  but  increases  for  long 









                                                            
20 Likelihood ratio test statistics presented in Table 3 indicate that the inclusion of chronic condition 
dummy variables significantly improve the explanatory power of the insurance models for all income 
unit types. 
21 Ngui et al use a dummy variable for doctor visits in the last two weeks and number of prescribed 
medications taken and found them to be significant. Cameron et al use number and severity of chronic 
conditions and find no significance. Savage & Wright 
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TABLE 4: PERCENTAGE OF PRIVATE HOSPITAL USERS BY DURATION INTERVAL AND 



















1  21.0  23.2  19.1  17.4  9.6 
2  68.3  65.5  63.5  56.8  51.3 
3  7.3  5.4  14.9  19.5  18.8 
4  3.4  6.0  2.0  5.9  13.7 
5  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  6.6 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
 
A summary of specification tests for model selection is presented in Table 5.  Health Insurance and Health Care Utilization:Theory and Evidence from Australia 1989-90 
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TABLE 5 : MODEL SELECTION 
  YOUNG SINGLES 
 
YOUNG COUPLES  COUPLES WITH 
DEPENDANTS 
OLD COUPLES  OLD SINGLES 
 
GAMMA 
                   
Insurance 
variable 
Dummy  Prediction  Dummy  Prediction  Dummy  Prediction  Dummy  Prediction  Dummy  Prediction 
Scale parameter  0.334  0.335  0.290  0.287  1.141  1.163  1.292  1.306  0.382  0.375 
Shape parameter  -3.822  -3.766  -3.961  -3.979  0.236  0.209  0.054  0.165  3.997  4.072 
Log L  -225.144  -225.302  -131.658  -131.375  -955.672  -968.195  -521.041  -526.638  -226.426  -226.289 
AIC  536.288  536.604  345.316  344.75  2005.344  2030.39  1126.082  1137.276  538.852  538.578 
Wu-Hausman 
( ) 84 . 3
2
1 = c  
 
          7.095* 
 
                     8.948* 
 
                     8.589* 
     
      -0.416 
                     
                     
                     
 
LOGNORMAL 
                   
Insurance          Dummy  Prediction  Dummy  Prediction     
Scale          1.158  1.177  1.293*  1.313*     
Log L          -957.372  -969.48  -521.084  -526.94     
AIC          2006.744  2030.96  1124.168  1135.88     
Wu-Hausman 
( ) 84 . 3
2
1 = c  
             
5.167* 
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Regressors in the duration model include reason for hospital stay, region, age, income, 
sex, and the estimated probability of having private hospital insurance (obtained from 
the probit analysis of private hospital insurance choice) or a private hospital insurance 
dummy variable.
22 
Model  (29)  was  estimated  using  the  insurance  dummy  variable  and  the  insurance 
prediction from the probit analysis. It is assumed that  0 T  is distributed according to 
the Gamma distribution. This distribution nests the Log-normal (shape parameter = 0), 
Weibull, (shape parameter = 1), and Exponential distributions (Weibull with scale 
parameter = 1). In Table 5 it is seen that the Log-normal and Weibull distributions are 
rejected for young singles, young couples and old singles, therefore, Gamma is the 
preferred distribution for these income units.  
For old couples, the null hypothesis that the shape parameter equaled zero could not 
be rejected, suggesting the appropriate distribution for  0 T  is Log-normal. To confirm 
this result, the Akaike (1974) information criterion (AIC) is calculated for the Gamma 
and Log-normal models.
23 The Log-normal model has the lower AIC so Log-normal 
is the preferred distribution for old couples. For couples with dependants, the null 
hypothesis  that  the  shape  parameter  equaled  zero  is  rejected  at  the  5%  level  and 
marginally rejected at the 10% level. The AIC was calculated and found to be lower 
for the Gamma than the Log-normal distribution. As a result Gamma is the preferred 
distribution for couples with dependants.  
Adverse  Selection:  A Wu-Hausman  test  is  applied to the  preferred model  to test 
whether  the  endogeneity  of  insurance  choice  leads  to  inconsistent  parameter 
estimates. The test statistic is  
) ( )] ( ) ( [ )' (
1
P D P D P D Var Var w b b b b b b - - - =
- , 
where  D B  and  P b  are the vectors of parameter estimates with the insurance dummy 
and  the  probit  prediction,  respectively,  and  the  middle  term  is  the  inverse  of  the 
variance-covariance matrix. This statistic is distributed chi-squared with 1 degrees of 
freedom.  Under  the  null  hypothesis  (insurance  exogenous),  both  D B   and  P b   are 
consistent  while  under  the  alternative  hypothesis  (insurance  endogenous),  P b   is 
                                                            
22 This dummy variable takes on the value 1 if the individual is covered by private hospital insurance 
and 0 otherwise. 
23 AIC is defined as  ) 1 ( 2 ) (log 2 + + + - = p c L AIC , where c is the number of covariates and  p  is the 
number of model-specific ancillary parameters that need to be estimated. Health Insurance and Health Care Utilization:Theory and Evidence from Australia 1989-90 
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consistent, but  D b  is inconsistent. The test statistic is given in Table 5 and the null is 
rejected at the 5% and 10% level for young singles, young couples, old couples, and 
couples with dependants.  
An interpretation of this rejection is that those income units for which the null is 
rejected take expected private hospital use into account when making their insurance 
decision, that is, there is adverse selection. Old singles have the highest proportion of 
income units over 65 years of age and are the only income units that do not behave 
strategically  when  making  their  insurance  decisions.  That  the  very  old  behave 
differently  than  other  income  units  was  suggested  by  the  insurance  choice  probit 
analysis where the coefficient on the dummy variable for those over 65 years of age, 
in old singles income units, was negative and significant. 
The appropriate model for young singles, young couples, and couples with dependants 
is Gamma with the insurance prediction from the probit analysis, for old couples the 
appropriate model is Log-normal with the insurance prediction, while for old singles 
the appropriate model is Gamma with the insurance dummy variable. 
General Results: Detailed results of the duration of stay regressions for the preferred 
models are given in Table 6. The effect of income on hospital stay duration is in 
general negative. Perhaps the opportunity cost of time is greater for individuals in 
income units that have higher income. Cameron et al obtained mixed results for the 
relationship between income and health service use while Hurd and McGarry (1997) 
found no relationship between income and number of nights stayed in hospital. Many 
reasons-for-use-variables are statistically significant indicating that different reasons 
have different durations associated with them. Since all individuals have a reason for 
use the duration of stay regressions do not have an intercept. As a result, the mean of 
the  baseline  distribution  of  0 LogT   is  absorbed  into  the  reason  for  use  parameter 
estimates.  
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TABLE 6: COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES FROM MODELS OF HOSPITAL DURATION 
  YOUNG SINGLES  YOUNG COUPLES  COUPLES WITH DEPENDANTS  OLD COUPLES  OLD SINGLES 
  Estimate  Std Err  Pr>Chi  Estimate  Std Err  Pr>Chi  Estimate  Std Err  Pr>Chi  Estimate  Std Err  Pr>Chi  Estimate  Std Err  Pr>Chi 
INSURANCE  1.021  0.668  0.127  0.506  0.553  0.360  0.633  0.308  0.040  1.171  0.491  0.017  0.148  0.232  0.524 
SEX  0.070  0.133  0.600  -0.226  0.179  0.206  0.305  0.111  0.006  0.247  0.159  0.121  -0.207  0.203  0.308 
DEP              -0.513  0.124  0.000             
DH3550  0.208  0.172  0.226  0.108  0.194  0.580  0.121  0.104  0.243             
DH5065              0.168  0.170  0.321             
DH65              -0.639  0.644  0.321  0.426  0.167  0.011  0.489  0.186  0.009 
HDINC  -0.012  0.008  0.148  -0.011  0.006  0.040  -0.007  0.004  0.042  -0.029  0.006  0.000  0.004  0.006  0.534 
SDINC        -0.011  0.007  0.111  -0.008  0.004  0.070  0.010  0.006  0.101       
Regions                               
HNSWCNT  -0.307  0.222  0.167  -0.546  0.326  0.095  0.514  0.167  0.002  0.076  0.243  0.756  0.281  0.406  0.489 
HVICMET  -0.143  0.159  0.369  -0.118  0.208  0.572  0.207  0.138  0.133  -0.052  0.219  0.814  0.231  0.249  0.354 
HVICCNT  1.387  0.750  0.064  3.301  0.481  0.000  0.567  0.198  0.004  -0.277  0.385  0.472  -0.466  0.380  0.220 
HQLDMET  -0.081  0.266  0.761  -0.425  0.290  0.142  0.524  0.202  0.010  0.423  0.303  0.163  0.166  0.394  0.673 
HQLDCNT  0.140  0.243  0.565  0.165  0.271  0.543  0.428  0.170  0.012  0.266  0.255  0.298  0.551  0.350  0.116 
HSAMET  -0.139  0.203  0.494  0.230  0.326  0.481  0.301  0.178  0.091  0.037  0.315  0.907  0.558  0.274  0.042 
HSACNT  0.293  0.365  0.422  -1.404  0.490  0.004  0.985  0.359  0.006  0.818  0.424  0.054  -0.962  0.850  0.257 
HWAMET  0.046  0.201  0.818  0.148  0.249  0.553  0.340  0.177  0.055  0.422  0.391  0.281  0.150  0.312  0.631 
HWACNT  0.278  0.516  0.591  -0.168  0.664  0.800  0.135  0.324  0.677  0.724  0.567  0.202  -0.288  0.790  0.715 
HTASMET  -0.459  0.445  0.302  0.356  1.875  0.849  0.281  0.320  0.380  0.379  0.503  0.451  0.309  0.439  0.482 
HTASCNT  0.096  0.988  0.923  0.169  0.465  0.717  0.068  0.312  0.828  -0.011  0.502  0.983  0.382  0.419  0.363 
HNT  -0.673  0.428  0.116  0.062  0.536  0.908  -0.484  0.479  0.312      .      . 
HACT  -0.605  0.423  0.153  -0.814  0.821  0.321  -0.222  0.557  0.691  -0.042  0.615  0.946  0.172  0.594  0.772 
Reasons                               
NEUROLH  2.443  0.665  0.000        2.533  0.760  0.001  3.726  0.511  0.000  7.112  0.631  0.000 
PSYCHH  2.349  0.500  0.000  6.465  0.467  0.000  4.966  0.703  0.000  2.746  2.002  0.170  6.735  0.515  0.000 
SURGEOhH  1.798  0.275  0.000  2.147  0.424  0.000  3.114  0.290  0.000  3.260  0.434  0.000  4.481  0.484  0.000 
VASCLRH  2.450  0.660  0.000  2.394  0.480  0.000  3.376  0.408  0.000  4.032  0.528  0.000  5.261  0.353  0.000 
UROLOGH  1.037  1.030  0.314  1.731  0.631  0.006  2.995  0.353  0.000  3.402  0.419  0.000  4.159  0.487  0.000 
GENERALH  1.384  0.393  0.000  1.689  0.430  0.000  2.497  0.226  0.000  1.553  0.484  0.001  5.481  0.698  0.000 
CARDH  0.640  0.945  0.498  1.651  0.677  0.015  3.886  0.527  0.000  3.909  0.455  0.000  5.532  0.423  0.000 
RESPRTRH  1.917  0.292  0.000  3.042  0.569  0.000  3.314  0.269  0.000  3.863  0.492  0.000  5.537  0.511  0.000 
GASTROH  1.355  0.341  0.000  1.985  0.508  0.000  3.212  0.264  0.000  3.156  0.364  0.000  6.155  0.412  0.000 
NEPHROL  0.958  0.523  0.067  3.701  1.000  0.000  3.586  0.540  0.000  3.300  0.701  0.000  4.572  0.466  0.000 
DERMATH  1.777  0.349  0.000  2.543  0.590  0.000  2.112  0.353  0.000  3.083  0.535  0.000  5.130  0.504  0.000 
IMMUNOH      .        3.296  1.660  0.047  4.566  0.971  0.000  4.624  0.767  0.000 
ONCOLH  1.572  0.357  0.000  2.718  0.941  0.004  3.360  0.355  0.000  2.853  0.373  0.000  5.715  0.446  0.000 
RHEUMATH  2.318  0.673  0.001            .  2.894  1.562  0.064      . 
OPHTHALH  2.492  0.522  0.000  3.041  0.735  0.000  2.385  0.418  0.000  2.380  0.384  0.000  4.162  0.434  0.000 
OPTOMH  1.826  0.795  0.022  2.071  0.714  0.004      .      .  0.000  0.000  . 
ENTH  2.223  0.428  0.000  2.716  0.703  0.000  2.345  0.261  0.000  3.498  0.679  0.000  4.151  0.767  0.000 
ORALH  1.982  0.233  0.000  2.687  0.393  0.000  2.455  0.295  0.000  2.038  0.914  0.026  4.173  0.747  0.000 
OGH  1.357  0.315  0.000  2.464  0.415  0.000  3.647  0.221  0.000  2.798  0.395  0.000  4.894  0.492  0.000 
PHYSH  1.140  0.615  0.064        2.400  0.588  0.000  2.906  1.786  0.104  4.907  0.515  0.000 
PLASTICH  2.133  0.652  0.001  3.053  0.653  0.000      .      .      . 
ORTHOH  2.026  0.206  0.000  2.478  0.327  0.000  3.622  0.231  0.000  3.797  0.345  0.000  5.909  0.438  0.000 
PATHOLH  1.005  0.440  0.022  1.896  0.476  0.000  1.820  0.371  0.000  2.257  0.498  0.000  2.791  0.936  0.003 
RADIOLH      .        0.518  1.229  0.673      .      . 
ENDOH  2.063  0.729  0.005  2.778  0.865  0.001  2.931  0.577  0.000  2.481  0.716  0.001  5.134  0.467  0.000 
SCALE  0.335  0.081  Gamma  0.287  0.099  Gamma  1.163  0.033  Gamma  1.313  0.048  LNormal  0.382  0.130  Gamma 
SHAPE  -3.766  0.910    -3.979  1.373    0.209  0.130          3.997  1.392   
LogL  -225.302  -131.375  -968.195  -526.940  -226.426 Moral Hazard & Adverse Selection in Australian Private Hospitals 
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Moral  Hazard:  The  main  variable  of  interest  is  the  estimated  coefficient  on  the 
insurance  variable.  This  coefficient  is  statistically  significant  for  couples  with 
dependants, old couples, and almost significant at the 10% level for young singles. The 
coefficient on the insurance variable gives an indication of the extent of moral hazard. A 
positive  coefficient  implies  that  insurance  decelerates  time,  that  is,  individuals  with 
private hospital insurance have a longer expected stay in private hospitals. For example, 
for couples with dependants private hospital insurance decelerates time by  88 . 1
633 . 0 = e , 
that is, an individual with private hospital insurance has an expected stay 1.88 times 
longer than an individual with no insurance regardless of reason for use. For old couples 
time is decelerated by  23 . 3
171 . 1 = e  which is a large increase in the expected duration of 
hospital stays. Table 7 presents the acceleration factors for the predicted and dummy 
insurance variables for each income unit type. It reveals the importance of performing 
the Wu-Hausman test as the acceleration factors for predicted and dummy insurance 
variables are quite different. 
TABLE 7 :ACCELERATION FACTORS BY INSURANCE VARIABLE AND INCOME UNIT TYPE 
 
Income unit type 
 
predicted q  
 










Young single  2.78**  1.25**  262  gamma  predicted 
Young couple  1.66  1.14  168  gamma  predicted 
Couple with deps  1.88*  2.17*  1020  gamma  predicted 
Old couple   3.23*  2.39*  461  lognormal  predicted 
Old single  1.54  1.16  197  gamma  dummy 
*   significant at the 5% level 
** almost significant at the 10% level 
 
 
No evidence of moral hazard across all income units was found, however, there is quite 
strong evidence for moral hazard amongst old couples and couples with dependants and 
weak  evidence  for  moral  hazard  amongst  young  singles.  To  some  extent,  this  is 
consistent  with  the  findings  of  Cameron  et  al  who  found  that  singles  with  more 
insurance used more health services. Manning, Newhouse, Duan, Keeler, Leibowitz, 
and Marquis (1987), Manning and Marquis (1996) and Lee (1993) also found evidence 
of  moral  hazard  in  the  U.S.,  however  only  Lee  modelled  the  interaction  between 
insurance choice and hospital service use. None of these papers distinguished between 
public and private hospital use. Savage & Wright 
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A survivor function for an individual from an income unit consisting of a couple with 
dependants, with and without insurance, is shown in Figure 1. The characteristics of the 
individual are: male head, aged between 50-65, living in metropolitan NSW, having 
surgeon as reason for use, and residing in an income unit with mean income . In the 
absence of insurance, the expected hospital stay for this individual is  1 . 19
95 . 2 = e  hours. 
The  same  individual  with  insurance  would  have  an  expected  stay  of  36  hours.  As 
expected the survivor function with insurance is located above and to the right of the 
survivor function without insurance so that individuals with insurance have a higher 
probability of their duration of staying being greater than t, for all t. 
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FIGURE 2: HAZARD FUNCTION 
 
 
The shape of this particular hazard function is indicative of the shape of the hazard 
functions  for  all  the  income  units.  The  shape  indicates  an  initially  increasing,  but 
eventually  decreasing  hazard.  Therefore,  once  an  individual  has  stayed  in  hospital 
around 10 hours the probability that they will leave hospital in the next hour decreases 
the longer they stay. The effect of insurance is to reduce the hazard, that is, given the 
individual has stayed say 10 hours, the probability that they will leave in the next hour 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The appropriate size of private and public health sectors and the design of insurance 
policies depend on the extent of adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection 
was found to be present for all but one income unit type. Except for the very old, 
income units act strategically in purchasing insurance in the sense that, if they expect to 
be heavy users of private hospital services, they purchase private hospital insurance.  
Given  the  existence  of  adverse  selection,  consistent  estimation  of  the  moral  hazard 
effect  requires  the  interdependence  between  the  insurance  choice  and  hospital  use 
decision  to  be  explicitly  recognized.  This  is  achieved  in  this  paper  by  using  the 
predicted probability of being insured as a regressor in the hospital duration regressions. 
It was found that the consistent estimate of the extent of moral hazard may be greater or 
smaller than the inconsistent estimate, though it was more common for the consistent 
estimate to be associated with a larger moral hazard effect. This highlights the need for 
using estimation methods that take into account the endogeneity of insurance choice 
when estimating the extent of moral hazard. 
Where significant, the moral hazard effect was found to be substantial. For income units 
consisting of a couple with dependants, insurance increased the expected length of stay 
by a factor of nearly 2, while for old couples this factor was over 3. Moral hazard 
effects of this magnitude have important implications for the design of private hospital 
insurance policies and cost control in the hospital sector. In Australia in 1989-90, there 
was basically one type of private hospital insurance policy and it did not include a 
deductible (an amount the insured individual has to pay in any claim). Perhaps this 
explains  the  extent  of  moral  hazard  in  private  hospitals.  In  1999,  private  hospital 
insurance policies vary and can include substantial deductibles. If detailed data were 
collected on insurance policy type and hospital service use, both private and public, then 
future research could be directed at ascertaining the relationship between deductibles 
and use and how this varies between hospital types. Moral Hazard & Adverse Selection in Australian Private Hospitals 
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The Period 2 Problem 
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is a discounting factor. 
 
The Period 1 Problem 
  Assuming  r = r ,  the  solution  to  the  period  1  problem  satisfies  the  following 
conditions, 

































l ,        (A.6) 
and 

































d l .       (A.7) Savage & Wright 
CHERE Discussion Paper 44 -–June 2001  41 
Reasons for Deletion 
24 
(i) they were a non-dependant living with their parents and mistakenly believed 
they were covered by their parents private hospital insurance (naidel,181,181) 
(ii) they were visitors to a private dwelling (fiudel,157,157) 
(iii) they  were living  in  a  special dwelling,  for  example, a  hotel  or  a  hostel 
(sdwell,643,643) 
(iv) they received income, but did not state how much (diudel,1420,1420) 
(v) they were employed by the armed forces (dfiudel, 63, 63) 
(vi) they visited hospital in the last 12 months , but duration not given (iudel12, 
122,122) 
(vii) they had insurance, but they did not know its type (iiudel,56,56) 
(viii) they visited a hospital in the last 12 months, but did not know whether it 
was a public or private hospital (tiudel,18,18) 
(ix)  they  were  employed,  but  did  not  state  their  usual  hours  of  work 
(wiudel,68,68). 
(x) they were the head of an income unit, but stated their health insurance type 
was not applicable (hnappins, 20iu) 
(xi)  they  were  heads  and  spouses  who  stated  their  type  of  private  hospital 
insurance was different (clash, 623iu) 
(xii) they were dependants who stated they had private health insurance while 
their parents had none (clash3,13iu) 
In addition to these deletions, 626 non-dependants who are between the ages of 15-20, 
are living at home, and have an income <$10,000 are reclassified as dependants, since 
they are covered by their parents private health insurance policy. 
 
 
                                                            
24 The name in brackets is the name given to the deleted variable in the data program, the first number is the number of individuals 
deleted, and the second number is the number of income units deleted. Moral Hazard & Adverse Selection in Australian Private Hospitals 




H = head of income unit, S = spouse in income unit, M = male, F = female 
HDINC = income, given by mid-point of a range 
HSEX, female=1, male=0 
HMVET, male with veteran affairs health card=1, otherwise=0 
HFVET, female with veterans affairs health card=1, otherwise=0; 
SIZE, number of individuals in the income unit 
INSURANCE,  estimated  probability  of  having  private  insurance  obtained  from  the 
probit model of insurance choice 
DEP, if dependant=1, otherwise=0 
For couples and couples with dependants, H=Head, S=Spouse 
Age Dummy Variables – omitted group, age less than 35 years 
DH3550, age greater than or equal to 35, but less than 50=1, otherwise=0 
DH5065, age greater than or equal to 50, but less than 65=1, otherwise=0 
DH65, age greater than or equal to 65=1, otherwise=0  
Country of Birth Dummy Variables - omitted group, born in Australia 
HNZUK, born in NZ or UK=1, born elsewhere=0 
HSEUR, born in Southern Europe=1, born elsewhere=0 
HWEUR, born in Western Europe=1, born elsewhere=0 
HASIA, born in Asia=1, born elsewhere =0 
HOTHERC, born in other country than above and not Australia=1,born elsewhere=0 
Education Dummy Variables - omitted group, school qualification 
HMBACH, male with bachelor degree=1, otherwise =0 
HFBACH, female with bachelor degree=1, otherwise=0 
HMDIP, male with diploma=1, otherwise=0 
HFDIP, female with diploma=1, otherwise=0 
HMTRADE, male with trade qualification=1, otherwise =0 
HFTRADE, female with trade qualification=1, otherwise=0 
For couples and couples with dependants, H=Head, S=Spouse 
Employment Status Dummy Variables - omitted group, not in the labour force 
HMFULL, male full-time employed=1, otherwise=0 
HFFULL, female full-time employed=1, otherwise=0 Savage & Wright 
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HMPART, male part-time employed=1,otherwise=0 
HFPART, female part-time employed=1,otherwise=0 
HMUNEMPL, male unemployed=1, otherwise=0 
HFUNEMPL, female unemployed=1, otherwise=0 
For couples and couples with dependants, H=Head, S=Spouse 
Region Dummy Variables – omitted group, living in metropolitan New South Wales 
HNSWCNT, living in country New South Wales=1, otherwise=0 
HVICMET, living in metropolitan Victoria=1, otherwise=0 
HVICCNT, living in country Victoria=1, otherwise=0 
HQLDMET, living in metropolitan Queensland=1, otherwise=0 
HQLDCNT, living in country Queensland=1, otherwise=0 
HSAMET, living in metropolitan South Australia=1, otherwise=0 
HSACNT, living in country South Australia=1, otherwise=0 
HWAMET, living in metropolitan Western Australia=1, otherwise=0 
HWACNT, living in country Western Australia=1, otherwise=0 
HTASMET, living in metropolitan Tasmania=1, otherwise=0 
HTASCNT, living in country Tasmania=1, otherwise=0 
HNT, living in Northern Territory=1, otherwise=0 
HACT, living in Australian Capital Territory=1, otherwise=0 
Health Status Variables 
HMSMOKE = average daily consumption of cigarettes 
HMALC = average daily consumption of alcohol in mls. 
Health Status Dummy Variables  
Chronic condition dummy where normally see a particular doctor: the first variable is 
for a major condition which normally requires hospital treatment, the second variable 
denoted with an S is a serious condition, and the third variable denoted with an M is a 
minor condition. The index  n i ,... 1 =  denotes that the income unit has ior more of this 
particular condition. 
DHNEUROLi, DHSNEUROLi, DHMNEUROLi, if normally see neurologist for 
chronic condition =1, otherwise =0 
DHPSYCHi, DHSPSYCHi, DHMPSYCHi, if normally see psychiatrist for chronic 
condition =1, otherwise =0 Moral Hazard & Adverse Selection in Australian Private Hospitals 
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DHSURGEONi, DHMSURGEONi, if normally see general surgeon for chronic 
condition =1, otherwise =0 
DHVASCLRi, if normally see vascular surgeon for chronic condition =1, otherwise =0 
DHMUROLOGi, if normally see urologist for chronic condition =1, otherwise =0 
DHMGENERALi, if normally see general practitioner for chronic condition =1, 
otherwise =0 
DHCARDi, DHSCARDi, DHMCARDi, if normally see a cardiologist for chronic 
condition =1, otherwise =0 
DHMRESPRTi, if normally see a respiratory physician for chronic condition =1, 
otherwise =0 
DHGASTROi, DHMGASTROi, if normally see a gastroenterologist for chronic 
condition =1, otherwise =0 
DHMNEPHROi, if normally see a nephrologist for chronic condition =1, otherwise =0 
DHMDERMATi, if normally see a dermatologist for chronic condition =1, otherwise 
=0 
DHSHAEMi, if normally see a haemotologist for chronic condition =1, otherwise =0 
DHMIMMUNOi, if normally see a immunologist for chronic condition =1, otherwise 
=0 
DHONCOLi, if normally see a oncologist for chronic condition =1, otherwise =0 
DHMRHEUMAi, if normally see a rheumatologist for chronic condition =1, otherwise 
=0 
DHSOPHTHAi, if normally see an ophthamologist for chronic condition =1, otherwise 
=0 
DHMOPTOMi, if normally see an optometrist for chronic condition =1, otherwise =0 
DHMENTi, if normally see ENT for chronic condition =1, otherwise =0 
DHMORALi, if normally see oral surgeon for chronic condition =1, otherwise =0 
DHOGi, DHSOGi, DHMOGi, if normally see a O&G for chronic condition =1, 
otherwise =0 
DHPLASTICi, if normally see a plastic surgeon for chronic condition =1, otherwise =0 
DHORTHOi, DHMORTHOi, if normally see an orthopaedic surgeon for chronic 
condition =1, otherwise =0 
DHMPATHOLi, if normally see a pathologist for chronic condition =1, otherwise =0 
DHMRADIOLi, if normally see a radiologist for chronic condition =1, otherwise =0 Savage & Wright 
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DHSENDOi, DHMENDOi, , if normally see an endocrinologist for chronic condition 
=1, otherwise =0 
DHSRETARDi, if condition was retardation for chronic condition =1, otherwise =0 
Reason for Last Hospital Use Dummy Variables: The reasons are grouped according 
to the particular doctor who usually treat these reasons. 
NEUROLH, usually treated by a neurologist  
PSYCHH, usually treated by a psychiatrist 
SURGEONH, general surgeon 
VASCLRH, vascular surgeon 
UROLOGH, urologist 
GENERALH, general practitioner 
CARDH, cardiologist 









ENTH, ear, nose and throat 
ORALH, oral surgeon / dentist 
OGH, obstetrician / gynaecologist 
PHYSH, physician 
PLASTICH, plastic surgeon 
ORTHOH, orthopaedic surgeon 
PATHOLH, pathologist 
RADIOLH, radiologist 
ENDOH, endocrinologist 